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Abstract 
The low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC) program has developed over two million 
rental homes for low-income households since 1986. The perception of deterioration in school 
quality has been a main reason for community opposition to LIHTC projects in middle-and 
upper-income areas. In this paper, we examine the impact of LIHTC projects on the nearby 
school performance. The LIHTC projects tend to have positive and statistically significant 
impacts on school performance the year they are placed in service and this finding is robust to 
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In high-cost metropolitan areas, it is challenging for low-income working families to find 
housing in decent neighborhoods. Many end up in poor housing conditions, which are 
detrimental not only to the occupants, but also to their neighbors and neighborhoods. In 
response, several public policy instruments have been implemented, including housing choice 
vouchers, inclusionary zoning, tax breaks for low-income housing developments and local 
affordable housing mandates or offsets. The low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC) program, 
our interest, provides incentives to develop quality multifamily rental units that are available at 
below market rate rents for low-income households. 
Previous studies of the LIHTC program have suggested that LIHTC projects and school 
performance both affect nearby property values, but very few have considered any direct 
relationships between subsidized units and school outcomes. In general, LIHTC housing 
developments are not likely to cause significant declines in neighboring property values and may 
even have positive impacts (Ingrid Ellen et al. 2005; Roxanne Ezzet-Lofstrom and James 
Murdoch 2007). Negative impacts exist for some projects under certain circumstances, but they 
tend to be small and can be reduced if the units are well designed and managed, compatible with 
the host neighborhood and not concentrated among other subsidized housing (Mai Nguyen 
2005). Several studies have considered school-level variables and property values. A recent 
study of the Philadelphia residential housing market (TRF 2009) found that elementary schools’ 
test scores significantly influence home sales prices. Kathy Hayes and Lori Taylor (1996) found 
a similar result, based on the school performance, in the Dallas area. Eric Brunner, James 
Murdoch and Mark Thayer (2002) looked at school finances, finding that equalization of funding 




previously associated with school quality. John Clapp, Anupam Nanda and Stephen Ross (2008) 
found that the increases in the percent Hispanic in local schools have an even more negative 
effect than decreases in test scores on housing prices in Connecticut.  
How LIHTC developments affect neighborhoods and schools depends on the local 
conditions and the type of development. Lan Deng (2009) looked at eight socioeconomic 
indicators of neighborhoods hosting LIHTC projects.
1 She found that most of the LIHTC 
neighborhoods experienced positive changes when compared to the comparison neighborhoods. 
Specifically, LIHTC properties invested in high-poverty neighborhoods are the most likely to 
generate positive impacts, while LIHTC invested in middle-class neighborhoods are the least 
likely to do so. The effects are more mixed in “working-class” neighborhoods. The role of 
LIHTC units may depend on whether the LIHTC project generates new or rehabilitated units. If 
LIHTC projects rehabilitate existing housing, they are likely to improve the existing 
neighborhood conditions by removing some of the blight in deteriorating areas (Anna Santiago, 
George Galster, and Peter Tatian 2001) in addition to improving the living conditions of the 
project occupants.
2 However, rehabilitated properties are more likely to be in neighborhoods that 
remain isolated with limited education and job opportunities. In Texas, the majority of LIHTC 
                                                       
1 The eight indicators include: 1) unemployment rate, 2) poverty rate, 3) percentage of 
households receiving public assistance, 4) median household income as a percentage of 
metropolitan median household income, 5) median gross rent as a percentage of metropolitan 
median gross rent, 6) median housing value as a percentage of metropolitan median housing 
value, 7) number of units built in the last 10 years, and 8) single-family mortgage approval rate. 
2 Rehabilitation project sometimes generate units because the properties may be underutilized or 




projects produce new units. If new units are located in segregated low-income neighborhoods, 
even though rents are subsidized, tenants may still suffer from the social problems associated 
with concentrated poverty. If the new units are built in higher income neighborhoods, existing 
home owners may exhibit a “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) attitude, due to their perceptions 
about the designs and quality of the multifamily properties, potential changes in neighborhood 
demographics, decline in open space, decreases in public services and safety and impacts on 
property values (Anthony Downs 1992; Meryl Finkel et al. 1996; Rolf Pendall 1999; Margery 
Turner, Susan Popkin, and Mary Cunningham 2000; Nguyen 2005). Moreover, the parents in the 
receiving neighborhoods may be concerned that their local public schools will become 
overcrowded and that low-income kids from the LIHTC units will exert negative peer influences. 
These perceptions can deter the construction of new low-income housing or drive existing 
residents to “flee” the neighborhoods and local schools, causing a downward spiral in the school 
quality. But are these perceptions real? 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the link between low-income housing, built 
through the LIHTC program, and neighborhood public school performance. We compile a panel 
dataset on approximately 4,000 elementary schools in Texas by spatially merging the almost 
2,000 LIHTC properties to nearby schools for the 2003-04 through 2008-09 academic years.
3 
The dataset facilitates estimations of the relationship between changes in school academic 
performance and changes in the numbers of nearby LIHTC units in various contexts. We discuss 
how the impacts of LIHTC vary when located in neighborhoods with different demographic 
characteristics and whether the projects are new constructions or rehabilitations. We find little 
                                                       
3 In the remainder of the paper, we will refer to the academic year by its end date. For example, 




evidence to suggest negative consequences on local elementary schools from LIHTC units. 
Overall, the contemporaneous impacts appear to be positive, statistically significant and robust to 
various specifications. Offsetting these, the one-year lag effects are negative and of similar or 
smaller magnitude.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide an overview 
of the LIHTC program with a focus on the state of Texas. Then, we discuss the mechanisms 
through which LIHTC units can potentially affect local schools. In the fourth section, we 
describe the data and main measures of neighborhood and school quality. The fifth section 
contains the empirical results followed by some discussion and policy implications.  
Overview of Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 
The LIHTC program was created under the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to incentivize 
private investors and developers to build rental housing for low-income households. The 
program gives a dollar-for-dollar federal tax credit to private investors in return for project 
equity. Investors, such as financial institutions, purchase the tax credits to lower their federal tax 
liability over a 10-year period. The typical amount of tax-credit-equity raised in a 9 percent tax-
credit transaction is between 45 percent and 75 percent of the development costs.
4 With the tax 
benefits, the private investors and developers typically need to raise only a fraction of the capital 
for the projects.  
                                                       
4 Another type of LIHTC offers tax credit at 4 percent. It is not as competitive as the 9 percent 
credit. Projects financed through tax exempt private investor bond are eligible for the 4 percent 
credit. Many projects financed with a 4 percent tax credit involve smaller development costs than 




The rents for LIHTC units that are occupied by qualified low-income households are 
required to be substantially lower than market rates. To be eligible for the tax credits, either 20 
percent of the units must be reserved for households with initial qualifying incomes at or below 
50 percent area median income (AMI), or 40 percent of units must go to households with initial 
qualifying incomes at or below 60 percent AMI. Federal law requires that the rents and incomes 
remain restricted for 15 years; but some states, such as Texas, apply land-use agreements in 
order to retain the units in the affordable housing stock for at least 30 years. 
The LIHTC is the largest federal rental production subsidy program, producing nearly 2.5 
million rental units from 1986 to 2009.
5 To maximize tax credit dollars, most projects designate 
all of their units to serve residents with income at or below 60 percent of AMI. LIHTC projects 
typically have high occupancy rates (95 percent for larger properties and 97 percent for smaller 
ones) and extremely low foreclosure rates (annualized 0.03 percent between 1991 and 2004, 
Ernst and Young 2007). 
Competition for the tax credits was fierce among developers and states when the 
economy was growing. The incentives for financial institutions to purchase tax credits reach 
beyond stable yields and offsetting profits. An investment in a LIHTC state or regional fund can 
also receive Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) consideration for both a community 
development loan and a community development investment (Joseph Firschein and Prabal 
Chakrabarti 2009).
6 The LIHTC program faced financing challenges starting in 2008, 
                                                       
5 The total drops to nearly 2 million if bond transactions are not included. 
6 The CRA requires federally regulated and insured financial institutions to lend and invest 
throughout their “assessment areas,” where they accept deposits and make a majority of their 




corresponding with the most recent economic recession. With falling demand for tax credits due 
to the drop in profits of large investors, the CRA has become the primary incentive for banks to 
invest in LIHTC projects (JCHS 2009). 
In Texas, the Department of Housing and Community Affairs (TDHCA) administers the 
LIHTC program with some oversight from the state legislature. To date, Texas has allocated 
approximately $750 million in tax credits to developers, leading to an infusion of equity that has 
contributed to the development of nearly 200,000 affordable housing units. 
 
Figure 1 LIHTC Units and Program Funding in Texas 
 
SOURCE: Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs LIHTC database. 
                                                                                                                                                                               
deposits of low- and moderate-income households; in return, they should open access to credit in 
these communities. The results of the CRA examination are considered when financial 
























Figure 1 shows the dollar value tax credit awards alongside the total number of units 
created over the 1989 to 2007 period in Texas. The dashed line (scaled on the right vertical axis) 
shows a general increase in allocations to Texas LIHTC properties since 1989. The substantial 
rise is mainly due to the increase in state appropriations by the U.S. Congress in 2001. The solid 
line (scaled on the left vertical axis) illustrates the number of LIHTC units produced in each 
year. Note that the units produced are not exactly proportional to tax credit allocation because 
LIHTC units vary in quality, location and size. 
The LIHTC program gives extra tax incentives for properties that are located in 
“qualified census tracts”—essentially tracts in which 50 percent or more of the households have 
incomes below 60 percent of the area median gross income, raising concerns about the potential 
for further concentrating poverty in certain areas. The Texas Legislature addressed this concern 
by mandating that new LIHTC developments be at least one linear mile from an existing tax 
credit project or not in a census tract with a large number of existing affordable units.
7  
Previous studies suggest that LIHTC properties deconcentrate low-income renters. Kirk 
McClure (2006) notes that 43 percent of LIHTC projects are located in suburban census tracts 
nationally, exceeding the percentage of the housing choice voucher program units in suburbs. 
Kristopher Rengert (2006) looked at the patterns by state. His results for Texas indicate that the 
LIHTC properties have relatively high penetration in suburban census tracts; however, the 
number of LIHTC in lower-poverty census tracts remains relatively low. Roy Lopez and Wenhua 
Di (2009) examined the distribution of LIHTC properties for Texas counties and found that the 
LIHTC projects are mostly located in the large metropolitan areas. Large central cities have the 
                                                       





most developments but have not received the largest awards when considered against their 
population in poverty. While suburban counties do not necessarily have large low-income 
populations, they are more likely than the central cities to have vacant land available for 
development. Thus, along with tax incentives, lower projects costs and demand for affordable 
housing have attracted many developers and investors to the suburban counties. Moreover, not 
all of the receiving census tracts are lower income. For example, in Tarrant County, more than 
40 percent of the LIHTC projects are located in census tracts with median income at or above 80 
percent of MSA median income.
8  
Potential Effects of the LIHTC Program on Schools 
There are several ways that LIHTC projects could influence local schools. Even though 
children in the project may benefit from improved living conditions and family financial 
situations, if the LIHTC properties are built near schools with limited resources, they may add 
stress to local schools. If the properties are built around primarily owner-occupied housing, the 
local schools, especially in the short term, need to be willing and able to foster the integration of 
poor children, many of whom likely moved from segregated minority neighborhoods. Some 
studies show that the academic performance of children from low-income households that move 
to less poor neighborhoods is below the average of their new school (Jacob Vigdor and Jens 
Ludwig, 2007; Brian Jacob and Jens Ludwig, 2009). Although movers are not necessarily less 
adaptable to schools than nonmovers (Karl Alexander, Doris Entwisle, and Susan Dauber 1996), 
being a renter rather than a homeowner is likely to negatively affect kids’ academic performance 
                                                       
8 Large metropolitan areas tend to have higher AMI than small rural counties in TX. Therefore, 
using MSA AMI instead of county AMI for metro counties may lead to a smaller percentage of 




due to the instable environment (Michael Mao, Maria Whitsett, and Lynn Mellor 1997; Eric 
Hanushek, John Kain, and Steven Rivkin 2004). Therefore, if school demographics change 
substantially due to LIHTC units, the immediate impact may be to lower the school’s overall 
average on standardized tests and academic rating.  
On the other hand, families that have managed to move into a subsidized development in 
a comparatively wealthy neighborhood are likely to be in better schools with more resources than 
they were in before. Such changes may facilitate improvements in their children’s academic 
performance. In addition, the parents who move into LIHTC properties in mixed income areas 
are likely to be relatively motivated, making their children more likely to be relatively high 
performers. Thomas Boston (2005) found that the families leaving public housing in Atlanta tend 
to move to mixed income housing or conventional public housing project in superior schools. 
Such improvements probably reflect a variety of positive influences in the new neighborhoods as 
well as the characteristics of their families. 
The literature is unsettled as to whether or not we should expect the effects on school to 
linger or change over time. The long-run effect depends on the success of the integration process. 
The role of peers in modifying achievement is not well understood. Jane Cooley (2006) shows 
that peer effects mostly take place within reference groups; for example, only peers in the same 
race and income group would matter. This suggests that importing lower-performing minority 
kids into a school will not negatively influence the majority. Caroline Hoxby (2000) also finds 
that students are influenced by their peers and that the effect may be stronger among peers of the 
same race. Mary Burke and Tim Sass (2008) find nonlinear peer effects. For example, a mean 
preserving spread in achievement may decrease achievement gains. On the other hand, the 




high-performing peers. Eric Hanushek et al. (2003) find that the variance does not matter and 
students throughout the achievement distribution seem to benefit from higher-performing peers. 
In contrast, William Evans, Wallace Oates, and Robert Schwab (1992) find that peer effects 
disappear after controlling for simultaneity due to the selection of peers. There is some evidence 
that kids with different cultural and economic backgrounds improve academic environments. The 
post- hoc black–white and Hispanic–white achievement gaps appear to be smaller in racially 
diverse schools,  and the SAT score differential between blacks and whites is greater in more 
racially segregated cities (Valentina Bali and R. Alvarez 2004). Moreover, the neighborhood 
characteristics seem to matter the most to student academic performance and not the segregation 
within schools (David Card and Jesse Rothstein 2007). 
   Other than peer influences, the behavioral responses of parents, teachers, and school 
administrators also add to the uncertainties of the long-term impacts of LIHTC properties on 
local schools. While some parents may increase their efforts to compensate for any real or 
perceived negative impacts, others may simply move out of the LIHTC-receiving areas. If some 
of the best achieving students leave the local school, the overall performance will suffer. 
Moreover, the preexisting input combinations in terms of teachers and support staff may be 
suboptimal after the opening of the LIHTC units. For example, with the arrival of poorer 
performing students, class sizes may be too large (Edward Lazear 2001). On the other hand, 
school administrators do seem to respond to accountability ratings (Eric Hanushek and Margaret 
Raymond 2005); hence, they may try to allocate additional resources and better teachers to 
mitigate any potential negative impacts. In terms of teacher responses, Amine Ouazad (2008) 
finds that teachers give higher assessments to children of their own race. Thus, if the LIHTC 




their performance may not improve. Additionally, teachers that are uncomfortable in the new 
environment may seek alternative locations (Benjamin Scafidia, David Sjoquist, and Todd 
Stinebrickner 2007).  
  In light of the literature, how LIHTC projects influence local schools is an empirical 
question. If students from LIHTC projects are not able to benefit from the new environment or 
the existing students are adversely affected, then we will observe a negative relationship between 
LIHTC units and school ratings. Conversely, if the LIHTC units provide a gateway for lower-
income families to access better opportunities for their kids without a detrimental effect on 
existing schools, and the demographic diversity created by these programs reduces the 
achievement gaps, then we will observe a positive relationship. 
Data 
The data for the empirical analysis come primarily from two sources. The first is the 
administrative data on LIHTC projects in Texas that is maintained by the Texas Department of 
Housing and Community Affairs (TDHCA). The dataset contains 2,311 LIHTC properties, 
including fields such as the property address, purpose (for example, general or limited to elderly 
residents), date placed in service, number of total units and units reserved for low income 
tenants, financing information, and the type of project (new construction or rehabilitation).
9  
                                                       
9 The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) also maintains a database on 
LIHTC, but we used its data only for reconciling some addresses or missing values in the 
TDHCA data. In particular, a key variable we use, the year that the property is placed in service 
(PIS_YEAR), was constructed with both datasets. Approximately 10 percent of our projects did 
not have the placed-in-service dates. Rather than deleting the observations, we approximated the 




These data were address-geocoded—in some cases by calling the property contact person to get 
the precise location—in order to get the latitudes and longitudes for the properties. After deleting 
the cases with missing values on the number and type of units or the placed-in-service dates, we 
ended up with 1,970 observations.  
Summary statistics of the TDHCA data are presented in Table 1. Note that the average of 
low-income units (LOW_UNITS) is approximately 95 percent of the average of all units 
(UNITS), indicating that the bulk of these projects provide housing exclusively for low-income 
tenants. Thus, we use UNITS in the remainder of the analysis. In Texas, newly constructed units 
(NEW) account for about 64 percent of total production of LIHTC units. Table 1 also gives the 
number of LIHTC projects that were placed in service (PIS_YEAR) from 2003–2008—the focus 
years for our analysis. As noted in Figure 1, there were a large number of projects placed in 
service since the allocation of the tax credit increased in 2001. In our data, approximately 35 
percent of the projects were placed in service between 2003 and 2008. 
The second primary source of data is the Texas Education Agency (TEA) website, which 
hosts a multiyear, multitable database on schools in Texas.
10  Of particular interest, the state 
accountability system of TEA assigns a rating to every campus and district in the Texas public 
                                                                                                                                                                               
data. This algorithm was justified by looking at the relationship between approval dates and 
placed-in-service dates for the observations with data in both fields. 
10 Campus level data include financial information, teacher information, student characteristics 
and academic performance. The TEA website also contains a GIS file with the district 
boundaries and addresses for the campuses within districts. The campus-level data were address-





education system each year. The rating generally falls into one of the four categories: exemplary 
(RATING=4), recognized (RATING=3), academically acceptable (RATING=2) or academically 
unacceptable (RATING=1). Ratings and other campus-level data are available from the 1997 to 
the 2009 academic year. Other rating codes appear in the data such as “not rated,” but we did not 
use any of those observations. Due to the transition of TEA to a new rating system, there were no 
ratings published for 2003 and starting with 2004 the ratings are based on the new system. 
Therefore, our analysis focuses on the panel between 2004 and 2009.  
In the top portion of Table 2, we present summary statistics for the elementary schools 
for 2008. Other years produce similar values so we only show one year as an example. For the 
2008 school year, the mean of RATING is close to 3 (recognized) and we have data on 4,045 
elementary schools.
11 Only 49 (or 1.2 percent) schools were rated academically unacceptable, 
1,059 (or 26.2 percent) schools were rated acceptable, 2,101 (or 51.9 percent) schools were rated 
recognized, and 836 (or 20.7 percent) schools were rated exemplary. Note that the reason that the 
number of observations is lower for the change in RATING from the previous year (∆RATING) is 
there were some new schools in 2008. For 2008, 2,342 schools kept the same ratings as the year 
before, 1,208 schools improved one level, and 317 schools dropped one level in rating. Only 75 
schools moved two levels up, and six schools dropped two levels, yielding an overall mean for 
∆RATING of 0.26.  
In terms of the other school and the student characteristics, we see that, in 2008, the 
majority of the students were minorities (PBLACK and PHISPANIC), almost 62 percent were 
                                                       
11 We only examine schools with appropriate ratings. Besides deleting cases without ratings, we 
deleted approximately 300 cases with anomalous data in terms of total number of students, total 




economically disadvantaged (PLOWSES), and 22.5 percent had limited English proficiency 
(PLEP). The average elementary school had almost 552 students (NSTUDENTS) and almost 38 
teachers for an average student-teacher ratio (STRATIO) of 14.7:1.  
 
Figure 2. Distribution of Changes in TEA Ratings from the Previous Year (19,433 Texas 
Elementary Schools, 2004-2009) 
 
SOURCE: Texas Education Agency Academic Excellence Indicator System 
 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of ∆       for the pooled data. With six years of data, 
we observe five years of changes for each school for a total number of observations equal to 
19,433.
12 Similar to the 2008 school year, the ratings remain unchanged over one year period for 
most schools. Some of the schools move up or down one level, but very few move two or more 
levels. Figure 2 illustrates that most of the schools that improved one level were initially rated 
academically acceptable.  In contrast, those that fell one level were mainly recognized. Among 
schools rated exemplary, approximately 25 percent fell one level the next year, while only 2 
percent fell two levels.  
                                                       


















The TDHCA data on LIHTC properties and the TEA data were merged with a three-step 
process. First, each LIHTC property was assigned to its school district using a point-in-polygon 
operation in Geographic Information System (GIS) software. Next, for each year, each LIHTC 
that existed in that year was assigned to its nearest campus, based on the straight-line distance 
within the district.
13 Finally, we determined the total units of LIHTC properties assigned to each 
school each year. It is important to note that no campuses were assigned a LIHTC property that 
was outside of its school district even if the property happened to be the closest LIHTC project to 
the campus. The spatial merge of the data by year facilitates the creation of a school-level panel 
data with six years of data—2004 to 2009. 
The lower portion of Table 2 shows summary statistics for the LIHTC data spatially 
merged to the school-level data. By 2008, 374 (or 9 percent) of the 4,045 elementary schools in 
Texas have at least one LIHTC project assigned to them. For this 9 percent, the average total 
number of units nearby is 324 although the range is from 1 to 2,761. Of the 374 projects, 260 and 
188 have been classified as either new or rehab project, respectively.  
Empirical Analysis 
Using the ratings as an indicator of academic success has its limitations because of small 
sample sizes per grade level in some elementary schools (Thomas Kane and Douglas Staiger 
2002). However, the state accountability system developed by TEA is by far the most 
comprehensive measure for school performance in Texas. The variables used to determine the 
ratings include “assessment results on the state standardized assessment instruments as well as 
longitudinal completion rates and annual dropout rates. Generally, campuses and districts earn 
                                                       
13 For example, LIHTC projects placed in service in 2007 will be considered existing for the 




ratings by having performance that meets absolute standards or by demonstrating sufficient 
improvement toward the standard” (TEA 2009). 
An ordered probit model 
We use the ordered probit model to estimate the direction, magnitude and statistical 
significance of the impact of nearby LIHTC units on the ratings of elementary schools, which are 
ordered and take discrete values. Instead of running a fixed-effect ordered probit model on 
RATING, we calculate the differences in values for all variables and use ordered probit on 
∆RATING. This expedites the computing process because the school fixed-effects are differenced 
out of the model. Additionally, the first-differenced model helps avoid the incidental parameter 
problem in discrete models with fixed effects (William Greene 2004). In the ordered probit 
model, the latent variable is estimated as a linear function of the independent variables and a set 
of cut points. The probability of observing the changes in the accountability rating from the 
previous year, ∆RATING, corresponds to the probability that the estimated linear function, plus a 
random error, is within the range of the cut points estimated for the changes in rating: 
Pr ∆             P r                ∆                ∆                            , 
Where j denotes school, ∆       indicates the changes in LIHTC units from the previous year, 
∆   are changes in school characteristics or other demographics,     is a vector of year dummies, 
which allow the intercepts to differ for each year, and    is the random error that is assumed to 
be independent and normally distributed. With six academic years, we have five years of 
differenced data. As shown in Figure 2 that there are seven values for ∆       : -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 




Table 3 shows the coefficient estimates for several specifications.
14 Model (1) is just 
∆RATING on ∆LIHTC—a dummy variable that indicates the existence of LIHTC units nearby. 
The coefficient is positive but not significantly different from zero. The “Cuts” in Table 3 denote 
the estimated cut points for the underlying latent variable, which we might think of as “academic 
improvement”. In Model (2), we add ∆UNITS. The coefficient on ∆UNITS is positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting that the opening of new LIHTC units is associated with 
positive changes in the accountability rating of the nearest elementary school. The estimate on 
∆LIHTC is still insignificant. The coefficients on the year dummies are not listed in Table 3, but 
need to be included in calculating the predicted value of the latent variable.
15 As suggested in the 
results of Model (2), a value for the predicted latent variable less than –4.571 will be in the first 
category of the observed variable (∆RATING = –3), while a value greater than 3.303 will be in 
the highest category (∆RATING = 3). The ordered probit model also implies a set of marginal 
effects—the increment to the probability of being in one of the categories from a marginal 
increase in an independent variable. Once again, using the estimates in Model (2), we find that 
the increments to the probabilities of being in the seven categories from an additional 100 
LIHTC units are: –0.00052 percentage points (to drop three levels), –0.041 percentage points (to 
drop two levels), –1.36 percentage points (to drop one level), –0.73 percentage points (to stay the 
same), 1.97 percentage points (to improve one level), 0.16 percentage points (to improve two 
levels), and 0.0026 percentage points (to improve three levels), respectively. In other words, an 
                                                       
14 To ease the discussion of the results, we drop the j subscript. 
15 For example, in Model (2) the assumed underlying equation is          0.0432   ∆       
0.000683   ∆        0.995    2005   0.183    2006   0.822    2007   0.186  
 2008, where    ˆ y




increase in the number of nearby LIHTC units is associated with an increase of the probability 
that the nearest school moves upward in its accountability rating or a decrease of the probability 
that the nearest school moves downward in its accountability rating.
16 The marginal effects of 
∆UNITS are significant except for the two extreme cases with small sample sizes.
17  
In Model (3), we add the lagged change in the number of LIHTC units, ∆UNITS-1, which 
allows the impact to take longer than one year. The coefficient estimate on ∆UNITS is now 
larger, but the lingering effect one year after the new units are placed in service is about the same 
magnitude but in the opposite direction.
 18 It seems that the initial positive impact from LIHTC 
units is negated after a year.
 In Model (4), we control for the change in student-teacher ratio, and 
its coefficient is negative and statistically significant as expected. Its inclusion does not affect the 
estimates of the rest of the coefficients. As we control for more campus demographics in Model 
(5), such as the change in number of students  ∆         ), the change in the percent of 
students that are economically disadvantaged (∆       ), and the change in the percent 
white  ∆      ), the coefficient estimates on ∆LIHTC, ∆UNITS and ∆UNITS-1 do not change, 
suggesting a lack of correlation between the LIHTC variables and school demographics.
19 The 
                                                       
16 The pattern of these marginal effects does not vary across specifications as long as the means 
of the other independent variables are used for calculation. So we do not present all of the 
marginal effects in the paper. 
17 Very few schools improve or drop three levels over one year period as shown in Figure 2. 
18 Multiyear lags are insignificant; therefore, we did not include them in the specification. 
19 None of the simple correlation coefficients between of ∆UNITS and the changes in the school 
demographic variables is greater than 0.06. K. Horn and Katherine O’Regan (2010) examined 




coefficient estimates of these variables are of the expected signs and magnitudes, which suggests 
that the overall structure of the models is valid.   
Variation of Impacts by Neighborhood and Project Type 
The effects of LIHTC units on local schools may vary by the initial neighborhood 
conditions. To investigate this, we divided the neighborhoods according to income and percent 
minorities in census block groups according to the 2000 Census. Lower (higher) income 
neighborhood are block groups with median income smaller than or equal to (greater than) 80 
percent county median income in 2000; Lower (higher) minority neighborhood are block groups 
with share of non-Hispanic white smaller than or equal to (greater than) 60 percent in 2000.
20 
There are 150 schools with LIHTC projects in lower income census block groups, and 224 in 
higher income areas. The average number of total units is 353 in lower-income census block 
groups, higher than that in higher-income areas (305). There are 136 schools with LIHTC 
projects in lower-minority census block groups, and 238 in higher-minority areas. The average 
number of total units is 289 in lower-minority census block groups, lower than that in higher-
minority areas (344). 
Table 4 presents the estimates for census block groups with these four different types of 
neighborhoods. We only control for the change in the student-teacher ratio in these regressions 
because we do not expect the inclusion of uncorrelated changes in school demographics to 
influence the estimated impact of LIHTC units. The estimates of the coefficients of LIHTC 
                                                                                                                                                                               
similar to that of the hosting neighborhood. The similarity may also suggest the relatively small 
number of children living in LIHTC projects comparing to the size of the receiving schools in 
Texas. 




dummies are still insignificant in all four types of neighborhoods. But for neighborhoods with 
higher income or lower minority shares, the confidence intervals of the estimates are mostly in 
the negative region (column three and five in Table 4). This seems to suggest some adverse 
reaction of schools to the appearance of LIHTC project in those neighborhoods. Turning to the 
contemporaneous impact of LIHTC units, however, we see significant results only in the block 
groups with median household income 80 percent or above county median income in 2000. 
Moreover, this effect is larger when compared to the entire sample results and it dominates the 
lagged effect, suggesting an overall positive effect. In higher minority neighborhoods, the impact 
of the lagged change in units is negative and significant, suggesting an overall negative effect. In 
lower income and lower minority neighborhoods, LIHTC units do not have a significant impact. 
Different types of LIHTC projects may bring various neighborhood changes. Therefore, 
we now consider how LIHTC affect local school outcomes if the projects are rehabilitation or 
new construction. In Table 5, the first column of coefficients is just Model (4) from Table 3. The 
next two columns contain the estimates for the new and the rehab projects, respectively. For 
these regressions, ∆UNITS is referring to the change in the number of new units for the 
regression of new projects, and the change in the number of rehab units for the regression of 
rehab projects.  Notice that additional new projects are positively associated with improved 
academic ratings, while additional rehab units do not affect the ratings. On the other hand, the 
appearance of a new project in a neighborhood that does not have any other projects (∆LIHTC = 
1) is not significant but negative and large in magnitude. Considering that higher-income areas 
are more likely to host new LIHTC units instead of rehabilitated units, this is consistent to our 
findings in the neighborhood results—some local reaction associated with the construction of 




influence of new students from the project is actually positive. The results for rehabilitation 
projects represent a very different pattern. None of the policy estimates are significant; hence, 
given that the rehabilitated units are located in neighborhoods with existing multifamily units, 
the addition of children from lower-income families does not seem to benefit the local schools. 
To explore the relationship a little further, we estimated the model for the various 
neighborhoods by types of projects. Table 6 displays the signs and significance levels for the 
coefficient estimates on the new and rehabilitated LIHTC projects in the regressions breaking up 
the neighborhoods. All of the models include ∆STRATIO and yearly dummies. The coefficient 
estimates on ∆STRATIO are always negative and significant and not presented. The cut points 
are also estimated but not presented. For comparison with earlier estimates, we also present the 
significant signs for the “All units” models that were listed in Table 4 and the first column in 
Table 5.  Overall, the coefficient estimates on ∆LIHTC are never significant with all the different 
samples. Evidently, the mere existence of LIHTC units nearby does not influence ratings 
independently from the effects captured by the number of units. Similarly, we do not see that the 
“Rehab LIHTC units” generate significant consequences on any neighborhoods. The relationship 
between LIHTC units and school ratings appears to be driven by the new projects. As noted in 
Table 5, the contemporaneous influence from the new units is positive, and the influence from 
the units built a year ago is negative (0.00137 versus −0.00108). This same pattern appears in 
higher-minority areas and in higher-income areas. In the higher-minority areas sample, the 
estimates are essentially the same magnitude (0.00120 versus −0.00117), while in the higher-
income sample, the positive influence slightly dominates the negative (0.0015 versus −0.0011). 
The one-year lag of new LIHCT units added has a negative impact on the lower income 




Influence of LIHTC on state standardized test passing rate 
The opposite directions of the influence of the contemporaneous and the lagged units 
added imply that the effect new LIHTC units brings students  initially helps academic 
performance, but this effect dissipates over time. It is likely that the new students “converge” 
toward the school norm after one year. However, as noted above, the rating system is 
complicated and reflects performance in different socioeconomic, racial and ethnic groups as 
well as completion and dropout rates, making it difficult to untangle any specific pathway for 
how LIHTC kids influence the rating. One direct pathway is through the school passing rate of 
the standardized Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS) tests—one of the main 
determinants in the rating scheme.
21 To analyze this pathway, we constructed a panel of 
elementary schools with fifth grade TAKS performance (percentage of those taking the tests that 
meet the passing standard) in the subjects reading (TAKSREAD), mathematics (TAKSMATH) and 
science (TAKSSCIENCE). Note that the TAKS panel is not the same as the RATINGS panel 
because some of the elementary schools that we used in the rating models do not have fifth 
graders. Also, some schools that received ratings may have been granted exemptions for some of 
the TAKS tests.    
Table 7 displays some of the descriptive statistics for the TAKS test variables for 2008.
22  
First we note that the TAKS test passing rates are negatively skewed—the distribution of passing 
rates tends to cluster after approximately 70 percent passing rates. Also, they tend to be 
                                                       
21 See the Requirements for Each Rating Category at: 
http://ritter.tea.state.tx.us/perfreport/account/2009/manual/table7.pdf 
22 While the shape of the distributions in 2008 is representative of other years, there is a slight 




leptokurtic (more peaked) when compared to a normal distribution, which is not surprising given 
that most schools are rated recognized or exemplary.  
We estimate the relationship between TAKS test passing rates and LIHTC units using a 
first-differenced linear model. The dependent variable is the changes in passing rates for TAKS 
tests on reading (∆TAKSREA), math (∆TAKSMATH) or science (∆TAKSSCIENCE). The 
independent variables are ∆LIHTC, ∆UNITS, ∆UNITS-1, ∆STRATIO, and annual dummy 
variables. The results are again insensitive to inclusion of campus-level student demographics 
once ∆STRATIO is included in the model. Table 7 also shows the relevant summary statistics for 
the first-differenced TAKS test passing rates in 2008.
23 
The signs of the statistically significant coefficient estimates of the LIHTC variables are 
presented in Table 8. The cell is blank if the estimated coefficient is insignificant. The mere 
appearance of new LIHTC units nearby in an area without existing LIHTC units does not 
influence the TAKS test passing rates when both types of units are considered. However, the 
appearance of rehab units has a positive influence in lower-minority areas and a negative 
influence in lower-income areas on the passing rates of all subjects, and has a negative influence 
on the TAKS science test passing rate in higher-minority neighborhoods. These results are not 
                                                       
23 Differencing the data solves the skewness issue, but there appear to be some unusually large 
changes in passing rates—the interquartile range is generally within plus or minus five points of 
the means, regardless of the year. Thus, one might suspect that schools with large differences 
may be influential observations. However, we did not find any reasons for discarding any 
observations. The residuals were analyzed with leverage and dfbeta diagnostics. See Belsley, 




seen in the estimates in the rating models presented in Table 6 as the ratings were calculated 
based on multiple subjects and other information.  
In general, if added LIHTC units have a significant influence, it is positive. The only 
exception is the influence of rehab units on the passing rate of TAKS reading test in lower-
minority area. In addition, if the lagged changes in units have a significant influence, it is always 
negative and smaller in magnitude than the contemporaneous effect (when both are significant). 
Overall, the results examining the influence of LIHTC on TAKS tests passing rates are largely 
consistent with the estimates of the influences on the state accountability ratings. 
Discussion 
The LIHTC program has been designed to produce quality workforce housing. However, 
the addition of multifamily units to the existing housing stock can influence the receiving 
neighborhoods in various ways. The perceived impact on the academic performance of local 
public schools remains a main barrier for developing these projects. Higher-income neighbors 
are worried about inflow of lower-performing students that might exert negative peer influence 
on their kids or compete for limited resources. There are also concerns that adding more low-
income students to existing struggling schools may exacerbate the isolation in segregated 
neighborhoods. In this study, we combine the longitudinal school performance data and the 
LIHTC project administrative data in Texas to investigate the relationship between the 
development of LIHTC projects and local school outcomes. We use a first-differenced ordered 
probit model to look at how LIHTC projects affect local public elementary school accountability 
ratings and a first-differenced linear regression model to examine how LIHTC projects affect the 




We find little evidence for overall adverse effects from LIHTC units on neighborhood 
schools based on the school level analysis. This seems true even though there are no substantial 
changes in school demographics associated with these projects. In various specifications, the 
addition of LIHTC units has a positive influence on school accountability rating in the same year 
as the projects are placed in service. However, the positive influence tapers off after a year—the 
added units have a negative lingering effect, which is of the same magnitude. As we break down 
the sample by census demographics, we find that the positive influence is mostly driven by 
LIHTC units in higher-income census block groups, and the negative influence is largely driven 
by units in higher-minority or lower-income census block groups. The pattern of influence also 
differs between different types of LIHTC projects. The addition of new projects seems to 
increase the likelihood of observing an improvement in the academic performance of the nearest 
elementary school. Across the various specifications, whenever there is a negative and 
significant lingering effect, there is an offsetting positive contemporaneous effect. We also find 
similar results in the estimations of the impact of LIHTC projects on TAKS test passing rates.  
It is worth pointing out a couple of data issues we encounter. First, the TDHCA 
administrative data on LIHTC also record the purpose of the LIHTC projects—either for general 
or elderly residents. Our analysis was based on the projects for general purpose. We estimated 
the influence of the changes in LIHTC units designated for the elderly on changes in school 
accountability ratings and did not find any significant results, suggesting integrity in the 
independent variables of interest. Second, we attempted to check the accuracy of our method of 
assigning LIHTC projects to schools. We found approximately 500 schools with sufficient 
attendance zone information that allows us to compare the nearest school (our approach) to the 




and many of the rest of the 25 percent were magnet schools. This supports that using the closest 
school is a reasonable approach given the lack of information on attendance zones over years.  
Considering the relatively small inflow of LIHTC children in elementary schools every 
year in Texas and the lack of correlations of these projects with school demographics, it is 
surprising to have found any significant relationships at all between LIHTC units and school 
ratings. However, our results are consistent with the previous literature indicating that such 
projects are not necessarily detrimental to the receiving neighborhoods. In fact, they seem to 
support the notion that LIHTC projects allow families of relatively high-performing kids to move 
to better neighborhoods. The findings of positive influence of LIHTC on higher-income 
neighborhood schools may dispel some of the concerns of homeowners in the suburban or 
higher-income areas and help address the barriers of locating LIHTC in these communities. 
These children living in LIHTC properties may perform better than the existing students at their 
new schools. This diversification of the receiving neighborhood schools can actually improve 
campus performance. However, the findings of the negative influence of LIHTC in lower-
income or higher-minority areas again justify the worries that neighborhoods densely populated 
with low-income residents may limit the advance opportunities for their children. Future studies 
are needed to specifically disentangle the influence of the various pathways through which 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of the LIHTC Data  
 
Variable  Description  Mean  Std. dev.  Min  Max  No. of obs. 
UNITS  Number of units  106.67  91.65  1  826  1970 
LOW_UNITS   Number of low income units  101.45  88.73  1  826  1970 
REHAB  Acquisition/rehabilitation   0.363  0.481  0  1  1970 
NEW  New construction  0.637  0.481  0  1  1970 
PIS_YEAR  Year placed in service  1997.7  6.85  1985  2008  1970 
  PIS_YEAR=2003         113 
  PIS_YEAR=2004         105 
  PIS_YEAR =2005          145 
  PIS_YEAR =2006          135 
  PIS_YEAR =2007          97 
  PIS_YEAR =2008          89 







Table 2. Variable Names, Brief Descriptions and Summary Statistics for the Data on Texas 
Elementary Schools in 2008 
Variable Description  No. 
of 
obs 
Mean Min Max 
RATING  TEA academic rating  4045  2.9  1  4 
∆RATING  Change in TEA rating from 2007  3948  0.26  -2  2 
STRATIO  Ratio of students to teachers  4045  14.7  7  31.5 
NSTUDENTS  Number of students  4045  551.7  44  1564
PWHITE  % of students white  4045  35.0  0  98.4 
PBLACK  % of students black  4045  13.3  0  100 
PHISPANIC  % of students Hispanic  4045  48.4  0  100 
PLOWSES  % of students economically 
disadvantaged 
4045 61.7  0  100 
PLEP  % of students with limited English 
proficiency  
4045 22.5  0  95.1 
LIHTC  LIHTC project nearby  4045  0.09  0  1 
UNITS†  Total LIHTC units nearby† 374  324.0  1  2761
NEW†  Total new LIHTC units nearby† 260  224.8  1  1682
REHAB†  Total rehab LIHTC units nearby† 188  236.4  1  1684
          





Table 3. Impact of LIHTC Units on Changes in Elementary School Ratings 
 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent *** significant at 1 percent 
 
  
Variables (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  
∆       0.0775 -0.0432 -0.0498  -0.0474  -0.0294 
   (0.125)  (0.144)  (0.171)  (0.171)  (0.171) 
∆UNITS  0.000683* 0.000872*  0.000849*  0.000838* 
   (0.000403) (0.000493) (0.000493)  (0.000494) 
∆UNITS    -0.000872** -0.000851** -0.000862** 
   (0.00038) (0.00038)  (0.000381) 
∆STRATIO  -0.0529*** -0.0213** 
   (0.00767) (0.00858) 
∆NSTUDENTS  -0.00132*** 
   (0.000161) 
∆PLOWSES  -0.00183 
   (0.0022) 




Cuts -4.572***  -4.571***  -4.324***  -4.321***  -4.343*** 
   (0.253)  (0.253)  (0.261)  (0.258)  (0.258) 
-3.325*** -3.325*** -3.293***  -3.300***  -3.322*** 
   (0.0463)  (0.0463)  (0.0601)  (0.0601)  (0.0604) 
-1.582*** -1.582*** -1.565***  -1.572***  -1.587*** 
   (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.0223) 
0.267*** 0.267*** 0.266***  0.262***  0.254*** 
   (0.0184  (0.0184)  (0.0187)  (0.0187)  (0.019) 
1.941*** 1.942*** 1.947***  1.948***  1.948*** 
   (0.0287  (0.0287)  (0.0296)  (0.0297)  (0.0299) 
3.303*** 3.303*** 3.296***  3.299***  3.305*** 
   (0.138)  (0.138)  (0.138)  (0.138)  (0.139) 




Table 4. Impact of LIHTC Units on Elementary School Rating in Various Neighborhoods 
Ordered Probit Regressions.  
Dependent Variable =  RATING  
 
 Variables  Lower income   Higher income Higher  minority Lower  minority  
∆       0.136 -0.195 0.0431  -0.3   
 (0.268)  (0.223)  (0.202)  (0.326)   
 UNITS  0.000231 0.00139**  0.00055  0.00151   
 (0.000727)  (0.000673)  (0.000584)  (0.00093)   
   UNITS
1  -0.000725 -0.000954*  -0.000870*  -0.000765   
 (0.000585)  (0.0005)  (0.00045)  (0.000717)   
STRATIO   -0.0509*** -0.0539*** -0.0583***  -0.0448***   
 (0.0127)  (0.0096)  (0.0099)  (0.0121)   
    
Cuts -3.965***  -3.314***  -4.137***  -3.304***   
 (0.279)  (0.0717)  (0.269)  (0.0853)   
 -3.270***  -1.600***  -3.301***  -1.575***   
 (0.11)  (0.0264)  (0.0847)  (0.0313)   
 -1.511***  0.256***  -1.572***  0.265***   
 (0.0398)  (0.0223)  (0.031)  (0.0266)   
 0.276***  1.921***  0.258***  1.929***   
 (0.0344)  (0.035)  (0.0263)  (0.0423)   
 2.011***  3.377***  1.967***  3.462***   
 (0.0558)  (0.191)  (0.0417)  (0.267)   
  3.187***     3.214***      
  (0.203)     (0.164)      
Observations 4607  10634  7713  7528   
Standard errors in parenthesis 
* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent *** significant at 1 percent 
Note:  
Lower (higher) income neighborhood: block group median income ≤(>) 80% county median 
income in 2000; lower (higher) minority neighborhood: block group share of non-Hispanic white 







Table 5. Impact of New and Rehabilitation LIHTC on Changes in Elementary School Rating  
2004-2009 All schools; Ordered Probit Regressions. Dependent Variable =  RATING  
 Variables  All  New projects  Rehab projects   
∆       -0.0474 -0.24  0.0106   
 (0.171)  (0.18)  (0.268)   
 UNITS   0.000849* 0.00137**  -0.000173   
 (0.000493)  (0.000595)  (0.00101)   
   UNITS
1   -0.000851** -0.00108**  0.000184   
 (0.00038)  (0.000427)  (0.000848)   
 STRATIO  -0.0529*** -0.0528***  -0.0531***   
 (0.00767)  (0.00767)  (0.00766)   
Cuts -4.321***  -4.324***  -4.322***   
 (0.258)  (0.258)  (0.258)   
 -3.300***  -3.302***  -3.330***   
 (0.0601)  (0.0601)  (0.0601)   
 -1.572***  -1.573***  -1.571***   
 (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022)   
 0.262***  0.261***  0.262***   
 (0.0187)  (0.0187)  (0.0187)   
 1.948***  1.947***  1.948***   
 (0.0297)  (0.0297)  (0.0297)   
 3.299***  3.299***  3.299***   
 (0.138)  (0.138)  (0.138)   
        
Observations 15241 15241  15241   
Standard errors in parenthesis 
* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent *** significant at 1 percent 
 




Table 6. Signs of the Statistically Significant Estimates of Coefficients on the LIHTC Variables 
by Type of LIHTC Units and Census Block Group Characteristics in the Ordered Probit Models  
Dependent Variables: ∆RATING 
Sample Explanatory  variables 
All units  ∆LIHTC  ∆UNITS  ∆UNITS-1 
All areas    +*  −** 
Lower minority       
Higher minority      −* 
Higher income    +**  −* 
Lower income       
New units     
All areas    +**  −** 
Lower minority       
Higher minority    +*  −** 
Higher income    +*  −* 
Lower income      -* 
Rehab units     
All areas       
Lower minority       
Higher minority       
Higher income       
Lower income       
* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent *** significant at 1 percent 





Table 7. Summary Statistics for the Elementary Schools with Fifth Grade TAKS Passing Rates 
in Reading, Mathematics and Science for 2008. (N=2,828) 
Variable Description  Mean    Min  Max Skewness  Kurtosis 
TAKSREAD  % Meeting reading standard  83.6  30  99  -0.91  3.66 
TAKSMATH  % Meeting reading standard  84.7  27  99  -1.08  4.41 
TAKSSCIENCE  % Meeting reading standard  80.1  11  99  -0.92  3.90 
∆TAKSREAD  Annual difference in 
TAKSREAD 
2.93 -43  43  0.07  5.12 
∆TAKSMATH  Annual difference in 
TAKSMATH 
0.70 -45  47  0.19  5.50 
∆TAKSSCIENCE  Annual difference in 
TAKSSCIENCE 






Table 8. Signs of Statistically Significant Estimates of Coefficient on the LIHTC Variables by 
Type of LIHTC Project and Census Block Group Characteristics 
Dependent Variables: Fifth Grade TAKS Test Passing Rates for Reading (R), Mathematics (M) 
or Science (S)  
Sample Explanatory  variables 
  ∆LIHTC  ∆UNITS  ∆UNITS-1 
All units  R M S R  M  S  R  M S 
All  areas      +**          −** 
Lower  minority               
Higher  minority      +*    −*   −** 
Higher  income               
L o w e r   i n c o m e         + *      −** 
New units  R M S R  M  S  R  M S 
All  areas      +*   +**  −**   −** 
Lower  minority               
Higher minority      -*  +*    +*** −***   −***
Higher  income      +**          -* 
Lower  income        +*  -**    -** 
Rehab units  R M S R  M  S  R  M S 
All  areas      +**  +*       
Lower minority  +***  +*** +*** -***  +***  +**    -***   
Higher  minority      +*         
Higher  income               
Lower income  -***  -**  -**  +*** +***  +***      
* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent *** significant at 1 percent 
Significance based on robust standard errors 